The Voting Automaton address (votingautomaton.eth, 0x9326029b9aF034cc05fdc9af453CeDF249aC7Ed9) is held by Mark Richardson, and is used exclusively for the purpose of voting in Bancor DAO decisions.
The Voting Automaton will vote in every proposal. Any governance incentives received by the Voting Automaton (e.g. ICHI, ZCN) will be used to buy vBNT and increase its voting power.
This thread will be updated regularly with exact plans on how the Voting Automaton will vote on upcoming proposals. However, it’s voting behavior is quasi-predictable.
The Voting Automaton will vote for most whitelisting proposals. In addition to the security and economic requirements for whitelisting, the Voting Automaton’s decisions are influenced by the following considerations:
- The whitelisting proposal is well-prepared.
- The token project team has acknowledged the existence of the proposal in a mainstream medium, such as Twitter, and/or has been present in the Bancor telegram channels to discuss their project with the Bancor community.
- The project with which the token is associated serves a clear purpose.
The Voting Automaton will vote to activate liquidity mining incentives on pools where there is a clear and present motivation to do so. The Voting Automaton rules for liquidity mining were updated on 6th August 2021 to reflect the changing culture, and Bancor’s maturing presence in Defi. The following criteria are not stringently applied, but represent the general approach:
- The Automaton will no longer support liquidity mining proposals for the sole purpose of attracting a higher TVL; this is an important consideration, but insufficient to support a liquidity mining proposal alone.
- Therefore, proposals that simply ask to grow a pool to competitive levels will no longer be considered a compelling argument. Liquidity providers on Bancor already have the the benefit of substantially improved yields compared to our competitors, and liquidity mining incentives should no longer be considered the default approach to expanding the network. Whitelisting is a strong value offering unto itself, and continuing to apply staking incentives to encourage liquidity provision undermines that value.
The Automaton will vote for any liquidity mining proposal that has established a tangible benefit to the health of the protocol. Liquidity mining incentives will be treated as an expense, and will require a sound financial justification as to how the additional costs can be recuperated, if not entirely, then at least in part. The precedent established by the staking incentives campaign for the $FARM token is an important one. In general, the Voting Automaton will vote against liquidity mining proposals, including extensions, on any pools that aren’t of special strategic importance. The notable exceptions are: $ETH, $LINK, and the USD stable coins, which serve another purpose entirely.
The Voting Automaton will generally support co-investment increases on established pools. Its decisions are highly influenced by, but not contingent on the following:
- The token project team and/or its community has expressed a sincere desire to establish a deeper source of liquidity.
- The existing pool has performed better than other pools of a similar size.
- The proposed co-investment increase is data-based, and of a reasonable magnitude. For example, targeting a depth comparable to that available on a competing platform.
- The token has not recently dramatically changed in price relative to the market.
The Voting Automaton will generally vote in favor of proposed changes to the Bancor ecosystem, and is heavily influenced by the following considerations:
- The proposed changes directly benefit BNT holders and liquidity providers.
- The proposed changes are innovative, interesting, and likely to draw attention from outside communities.
- The proposal is well-written, thorough, with strong evidence for the anticipated outcomes, ideally backed by experimental observations.
- The proposed changes are iterative, forming a clear development narrative based on community feedback and known issues.
- The targets are realistic and can be completed in a reasonable time period with resources that are already available.
The Voting Automaton will support proposed changes to governance that do not abjectly challenge any of the following:
- The security and legitimacy of the DAO should be maintained above everything, even if inconvenient.
- Inclusiveness and broad participation in DAO decisions are never a bad idea.
- Creation and submission of proposals should be actively facilitated, and additional resources to assist community members to become active in the DAO is generally beneficial.
- Decentralization is important, and always will be.
However, the Voting Automaton is also in support of restructuring and adapting the DAO as required to maintain smooth operations. Proposals to modify specific elements of the DAO process are considered on a per-case basis. For example:
- The Voting Automaton would have supported the DAO transition to Snapshot, despite the centralized nature of the system. Decentralization of the decision making is more important than the decentralization of the technology.
- The Voting Automaton is likely to support concepts such as quadratic voting and voting decay, depending on the implementation.
- Proposals to reduce the quorum requirement or supermajority rules are unlikely to be supported. However, increasing one of these to help offset a reduction in the other will be carefully considered.