The author has chosen to withdraw their proposal
I wanted to add step-by-step guidelines on the withdrawal process to make clear what this looks like from an LP perspective. More importantly, I want to emphasize the fact that you are always shown the number of tokens that you will receive on the final screen when you withdraw. This is important because you can refer to the “IL Protection” mechanism by any name but it has always been clear (since BNT distribution was disabled on 6/19) to LPs the exact amount of tokens that you will receive if you move forward with the withdrawal.
There are two steps when you are going to withdraw from Bancor. The first step is to enter cooldown and it looks like the following:
In this step, you will not see the TKN amount you will receive if a pool is in deficit. Essentially, at the moment, this screen only shows you the quantity of TKNs that your bnTKNs pool tokens are capable of unlocking (this is assuming you are able to withdraw without a deficit).
After you enter cooldown, you will see a withdrawal box on the right hand side of your portfolio that matches the amount of TKNs from the cooldown window:
When you actually go to withdraw, this screen shows you the withdrawal amount that you will be receiving based on the pool conditions in the current block. This amount can change from one block to the next depending on the deficit and surpluses in the pool. In this example, the link pool has a deficit and out of the 10895 LINK tokens I will only receive 6084 LINK tokens If I proceed with the withdrawal.
Thank you for this well-researched proposal. It seems reasonable for the BProcotol Foundation to show more transparency, especially in this scale event which impacts the future and reputation of the Bancor protocol.
As a longtime member of the Bancor community, I wholeheartedly support this push for greater transparency and clarity on the role of the BProtocol Foundation. This proposal is the result of arbitrary delineations between the Bancor protocol, which gladly takes user deposits and communicates the risks involved with varying levels of clarity, and the Bancor Foundation, which was created as a safe haven for money the Bancor founders gladly took from the community via the ICO.
If the Foundation wants to ensure there’s a future for the protocol and its employees – contractors, core contributors, et al – then I hope they seriously consider their responsibility in making things right. They can certainly hide behind legal protections created by their all-star team of lawyers, but further attempts to do so will result in a complete vote of no confidence by the community at large.
To be clear, there is a straightforward path to making LPs whole again without having to harm the price of BNT. But there is no path forward for an AMM that cannot incentivize liquidity providers due to loss of trust.
Public sentiment toward Bancor is reaching nadir levels. This can be completely reversed through an act of good faith – not some convoluted plan to hope everything fixes itself through revised tokenomics and further unproven claims based on napkin math from PhDs. Deliberate actions that show the Foundation understands its contractors/contributors screwed up and, therefore, chooses to take responsibility, will create a groundswell of public support from all corners of defi.
Bancor is at a crossroads. I hope they understand the implications of trying to hoard their treasury funds at the cost of their users. There is no future to finance without fixing the present.
@DarkKnight is there any reason why this proposal needs to go up on 7/10? This was posted on 7/8 and I don’t think sufficient time will have been allotted for discussions to occur before this goes up for any sort of vote. Our guidelines require a minimum of 2 days if not more (yes, I think this requires more than two days) depending on the proposal to be discussed before going up for any sort of vote. My suggestion is for this to go out next Sunday the 17th for any discussions to occur before it goes on Snapshot.
As a reminder, we do have a due process:
and relevant to my previous comment:
Mandatory Community Review Time
Before the proposal can be moved to Snapshot for voting, the proposal must be available for review by the community for at least 2 days; however, 3 days is standard. Therefore, the proposal should include a planned time and date for the vote to begin, and cannot be sooner than 2 days from the time of its publication.
The current expected time for this proposal to appear in Snapshot will make it invalid. I highly suggest submitting this for voting on next Sunday to give the community enough time for discussion.
@glenn of course terminology can be whatever the team wants, the point is that there was a year while the DAO, LPs and general public were unaware of significant incoming changes and are now scrambling to adapt with relatively little notice, documentation, messaging, training, etc. The entire time, the Foundation presumably was privy to all upcoming developments (and farmed v2.1 and deployed millions of vBNT to parictipate in DAO governance).
The withdraw screen is too late, and whoever decided to pause the contracts seems to believe this too as evidenced by the associated freeze on deposits when ILP was disabled. People need to know the moment they put funds IN to bancor what the mechanics are, they can’t wait to find out when they take (significantly less) money OUT.
AFAIK the DAO never asked for v3 to be developed in secret, i’ve seen many from the community repeatedly ask for the opposite, for details to be released because the future migration from v2.1 to v3 may impact the (then) current management of v2.1.
Generally these requests is/was met with one of two responses:
- “If it was up to me I would be working open source but I’m not allowed to”.
- “dashboards are coming in v3 and there’s no resources to get the data for v2.1 because everyone is busy building v3”.
So OK it seems like neither the DAO nor “the team” actually has agency over, nor enough information, time and money to take meaningful responsibility for protocol governance. Whether that’s true or false, it absolutely needs to be clarified so that vBNT holders understand the exact utility of their token holdings.
At a high level this proposal ONLY requires that the Foundation speaks for itself so that “we” (the DAO) can have some kind of discourse with “them” separate from “the team”.
As the Foundation is a separate entity from the DAO and team it should behave like one:
- Appoint a representative(s)
- Have that representative(s) make authoritative statements on behalf of the Foundation
- Have the representative(s) be clear and public about what the Foundation’s role and stance is on all relevant matters.
- Do NOT allow “the team” (who are grant receivers NOT grant givers) to speak on behalf of the Foundation
The point of my update was to make it very clear that the withdrawal screen shows you the number of tokens that you will receive. If the pool is in surplus or deficit, you will always know at withdrawal what you are going to be getting. There should never be a scenario where someone claims that they did not know that they were getting fewer tokens at withdrawal when a pool is in deficit.
Since the abstain option was made available to the Bancor DAO, the foundation has always chosen to “abstain” from voting. This went into effect in December of last year:
and you can look at the history of the foundation votes to see that this has been occurring:
Prior to that, the foundation voted either “for” or “against”. As an observer and as someone that has participated in snapshot votes, the foundation typically followed this patten during this time period:
- Typically waited towards the end of when a vote would expire to vote.
- Voted with the majority of the community
This is understood and has arisen since the emergency actions from 6/19 went into effect. You are now exposed to pool deficits and can realize a loss when withdrawing from such a pool while it is in a deficit state. It is important to note that deposits were disabled for this specific reason on 6/19 and are still currently disabled at the moment.
From my perspective, perhaps the most important question is the following:
as this will shape any future conversations.
you are not an official representative of the Foundation, or are you?
the Foundation should speak for itself in all matters, all the same points you make are better coming from them directly in the appropriate channels for that conversation
also, to directly respond:
i agree with your points as presented
none of the withdrawal mechanism mechanics/UX are directly relevant to the proposal or the issue at hand, it’s presented as context to show a single topical example of some information (redefinition and “socialization” of individual-level 2-sided IL to shared pool-level 1-sided IL) that was not available to the general public for a year that could have been relevant to DAO governance during that year
btw i agree that the Foundation is generally operating at “arms length” in terms of voting, I’ve also noticed the same
The only point i wanted to make is that they are operating with significant information asymmetry vs. the majority of other DAO participants, it’s then an awkward situation because if they don’t participate they can be accused of having no faith in their own system, and if they do they can be seen as operating with a privileged position relative to all other vBNT holders, arguably undermining decentralisation
The problem is not so much the direct actions of the Foundation but the indirect effects of the lack of self representation and transparency, so we’re all just observing and speculating, rather than listening and responding. It’s unnecessarily confusing imo.
Requesting clarity and public representation is NOT an accusation of wrongdoing, it is ONLY establishing the DAO’s preferred operating requirements for the DAO/Foundation relationship
I don’t see any harm of it bypassing the 3 day review process, since it does not have a direct affect on any DAO parameters. But rather a gauge. (the timeline for response is up to the Foundation)
It’s not three days but two days per the guidelines requiring review by the community. If the OP wants to put this up tomorrow, I ask that he does so at 1:51 pm EST on Sunday, July 10, 2022 to at least adhere to our guidelines.
I was basing the time of the 3 days on the infographic which states mandatory (guess conflicting information).
Really looking forward to voting in favour for this proposal. Foundations raising ICO funds for a decentralized protocol was/is a significant approach to launching in the space. Crypto-friendly Swiss law has allowed for this structure to flourish in that country. MME Law Firm being the most prominent, not only setting up BProtocol Foundation, but also Ethereum & Tezos foundations.
No one questions the separation of protocol/DAO & foundation, in a bull market. But in a bear or if there is an exploit (e.g. DAO hack) this relationship comes into question as people are looking for someone to blame. Some pros & cons to a foundation bailout of Bancor:
Pro: (1) LPs are made whole, (2) sentiment improves (slightly) of the protocol as foundation seen as a backstop, (3) Protocol doesn’t die with ICO money still with foundation (i.e. rug) & (4) Bancor seen as sustainable by institutions/regulators & don’t need govt. bailout.
Cons: (1) Foundation becomes at risk of liability for the protocol, (2) Strength of DAO weakened by foundation, (3) Bailout reduces funds for future development, (4) Point of centralization of Bancor & (5) $BNT could be deemed a security if there is a centralized entity.
Conclusion: Clarity on this issue will help the DAO & protocol moving forward. I personally would want in the future that the funds raised during ICO be put under the control of the DAO to function in development & emergency backstop.
Closing thread, please feel free to create another one if anyone is interested in doing so.
Note that there are ongoing discussions about potential recovery plans happening in another thread: