For avoidance of doubt, I am an existing V2.1 LP in the surplus Chainlink pool and been very vocal in my non-consent for migrating to V3. I have a deep understanding of the v2.1 design, which I felt comfortable participating in, and chose to opt-out of any potential upside that may have arisen from v3, staying in a pool that is not prioritized in the liquidity router due to the upgrade.
I exercise my right to opt-out of any future protocol upgrades from v2.1 and directly withdraw from v2.1 with no impermanent loss protection. This right to opt-out is clearly defined in the terms of the V2.1 smart contract. Please see the Upgradeability Clause and link to github below:
This is a massive breach of the protocols obligations if forced migrations from v2.1 are voted through. This not only presents potential massive damages to v2.1 LPs (the DAO members could potentially be liable as limited partners of the DAO), but has massive implications to the future of Bancor attracting new liquidity.
This would be the first breach of the obligations from the protocol. The turning off of ILP was not a breach, as it was voted on as multi-sig right in BIP21. Breaking these terms would be a massive breach of trust to existing and future stakeholders of the protocol.
It’s imperative the community honors the Upgradeability Term of v2.1. There is clearly non-consent from many 2.1 LPs, hence why their positions stay in 2.1. This is especially present in 2.1 surplus pools. One thing to consider in regards to deficit pools is that there is currently no UI information on the health of an LPs position. If these figures were provided in the UI, I would think 2.1 users in deficit would likely opt-in to migration to v3, given their right per the Upgradeability Term.