@mbr I have updated the proposal with your suggestions. I completely agree with them, and since others have expressed the same, it’s reasonable to do so. Thank you for the thorough proposal discussion points, they have also been added to the post as they offer crucial background on the thought-process behind each suggestion.
With this proposal, we’re inevitably aiming to increase the complexity of the quorum and supermajority rules. Hence, I want to suggest a change to increase transparency that is in my opinion, essential to avoid voter confusion:
- When put up for voting, a proposal shall include the quorum and supermajority requirements for it to pass.
- The whitelisting, LM rewards activation/extension and co-investment proposal templates shall include a paragraph with the quorum and supermajority requirements for all types of proposal to streamline the proposal drafting process.
I would like to express my support for @glenn’s idea as well.
Although I believe whitelisting and co-investment increases pose a higher immediate security liability to the protocol, LM rewards - even if given over time - very quickly drive liquidity to a pool, hence quickly putting a high amount of BNT at risk. An example of this is the UNIBNT pool, with rewards activated on the 1st of March, below. Notice the immediate jump in liquidity.
Could someone else provide their opinion? I’m in favour of including it in the proposal.
As far as removing inactive voters, I believe I may have been lax in the terms used. I am mostly in favour of a dynamic quorum system that does not require contract update. All the information is already present on-chain.
Nevertheless, a solution using a voter decay tactic as debated in the last community call (24th of May) tackles exactly the kind of issues that I’m trying to expose:
- Wallets can become inaccessible by the holders, be it from losing their keys, passing away without leaving such an information, etc.
- I don’t agree that a decision to reduce inactive voters’ voting power will raise eyebrows - ultimately the crypto space is in exponential growth and any decision that the DAO makes has an impact on the long term success of Bancor. Therefore, such decisions should be taken by members which are more engaged and thus more likely to be informed about the current state of Bancor. To summarise, inactive members pose a weight on the quorum, are more likely less informed and as mentioned before, might also be eternally inactive. For these reasons, I believe that a well managed DAO should address the issue of inactive voters.
- Lastly and perhaps most importantly - not removing or changing the voting power of inactive voters opens up a soft attack vector on the DAO governance. If a large enough vBNT wallet stakes in governance with the goal to never vote, it might be able to lower quorums such that no proposal is passed. I’ll give an example. There are currently 13,324,751 vBNT staked in governance. If the wallet with the most vBNT right now (6,156,412.16 vBNT) were to stake and purposely NOT vote, quorum would be reduced by 31.6%. Average total vote participation would be reduced to 13% instead of the current 19%. Finally, to permanently reduce the maximum quorum to 30%, one would have to stake 44,415,836 vBNT and not vote. At $1.56, that’s $69,288,704 if you could directly purchase all the vBNT. 2,346,645 vBNT is currently in the vortex, and as the pool gets bigger and more vBNT is in circulation, the potential for a whale to buy enough vBNT to render governance useless poses a mild but unnecessary risk. How long would it even take for us realise it and adjust governance rules accordingly?