OK, I think this is better than airdropping and would shift the focus of claiming voting rewards to the end user. The only problem with this is that the possibility of being a vBNT holder and having stake vBNT in the governance contract without having any active positions does exist (e.g. speculating that vBNT = BNT in the future and outside speculators might have bought tokens at a cheap price now. While waiting, they stake their vBNT in the governance contract to get rewards for voting). The only tweak that we would have to do is to accumulate the rewards separately (not rewards wallet) and let the users claim at their leisure.
Both good and I also leans towards looking at # of proposals per week as @Jefe-fintechv1 alludes to (we already have a cadence that voting happens on Monday). Perhaps the rewards can be based on the number of proposals that are live for a specific week? A quick example, if we have < 5 proposals then we set aside ~300 BNT for rewards (roughly $2000 assuming BNT price of $7). If we have 5-10 proposals then we set aside ~600 BNT etc… Distribution can be as simple as:
((Number of proposals you voted for) / (Total number of votes across all proposals)) * BNT set aside for that week
I still like the ballot page idea for my ideal voting experience. My concerns are several. To start, that it might not be possible with how Snapshot works, or it’s really labor intensive, or that only Snapshot team can do it. It’s not a current feature for them, and I saw that our own @tenzent has an outstanding feature request in Snapshot from early March to simply see the current vote count from the proposal landing page. It’s unfortunate because Banacor legacy governance had these features which we lost when migrating to Snapshot.
I’m also worried that voters might not give the attention each proposal deserves if they can scan over them. LM Reward votes draw those interested in their token. BIPs always draw everyone. Whitelists however are both frequent and require a lot of scrutiny. When we put voting rewards into the mix, I worry that the “greedy voter” will just react to the token name and snap vote with even reading the proposal.
We have to find out if this “stakedrop” idea is even possible but it really does feel like a perfect solution. If the fatal flaw in that idea is vBNT-only holders missing out, I’m okay with that. a) They have a totally speculative position that does not help the protocol (not LPing). I say this as someone who is heavy vBNT speculatively. And b) What else are they gonna do? Sell? LP in Balancer (doesn’t help us). We’re trying to attract BNT non-whales to governance with bribes. How many vBNT-only non-whales are there really? And all they need to do to collect rewards is have any BNT stake, however small. (edit: really they just need to have any staking position at all, even non BNT).
I consider whitelistings to be the most important votes since they are the gatekeepers to protocol growth and crucial to protocol health. I think this is reflected in the quorum requirements. That said I’m not opposed to a flat structure. In general, the flatter everything is the easier it will be to understand the data and make changes.
Since Snapshot was introduced, we’ve had five blocks (weeks) of voting. We’ve had 52 proposals over that time (and 32 of them whitelistings), so roughly 10 votes per week.
Before Snapshot we had 57 votes over 15 weeks, so about 4 votes per week. (Snapshot has really helped the DAO!).
I would say that 10+ votes per week is fair (and expecting that to grow as Bancor grows).
This is an interesting thought process. Scaling systems are hard to predict but we can always go back and change it. Are we still tied to proportional rewards? I really feel like a simple (Proposal Reward / Unique Addresses) for each proposal would work. I was originally thinking something like:
200 BNT per proposal ∴ ~2000 BNT a block ∴ ~8000 BNT a month ∴ ~$56k USD per month on voting rewards at current prices.
I don’t know what an appropriate amount is but in the context of a 2 billion dollar protocol that doesn’t seem too bad. Maybe tweak down?
Also I anticipated this program functioning until the end of LM rewards at which time we come back and decide if we still need it.
There is a sizeable amount of vBNT holders outside of the governance contract at the moment. Some of these individuals could be LPs in Bancor or have acquire vBNT for speculative reasons. There is also the possibility that they might have acquired vBNT to have more voting power in the DAO (could be important in the future, who knows). If we can come up with a solution that doesn’t exclude these folks by accumulating voting rewards in a separate wallet (not the rewards wallet for LPs) then I think it is fair for us to do that (perhaps you collect your voting rewards from the “vote” page in the Bancor app just like you stake from there as well).
In my opinion, if we keep it simple then the implementation would be easier. We incentivize voting in general as we want greater participation and treat all voting rounds equally. The amount of BNT being set aside for rewards for that week based on the amount of proposals that are being voted on.
Yes, I think we tweak down. As to what’s an appropriate range, I think somewhere between $2500-$15K (that’s roughly ~2100 BNT Max assuming price of $7) per month. The proposal that comes out of this process should have a fixed term (3, 6, 9 , 12 months etc…) set with the DAO having the capability to renew the program any number of times.
What if we built a ballot system and made one vote a month with the ballot? That would probably save a lot of gas, especially if we used gas tokens. Doing rewards in one massive block makes things easier to calculate for, I think. We could consider the idea of using Sablier (compounding?) streams to distribute rewards; you participate in a vote and when you do that your reward stream is started and runs its course over the month.
The Sablier protocol doesn’t appear to have a wide range of tokens available, and notably all of our native tokens are absent. There are two options to deal with this:
We can contribute to the Sablier protocol somehow and get BNT/vBNT added to the protocol, and also potentially get a stake of COMP and influence Compound Governance to add BNT/vBNT to the protocol so we can run compounding streams natively.
We can automatically swap to a highly liquid asset (with a good rate on Compound if we go that route) when we initiate the reward stream, and when the holder autostakes/withdraws their rewards, we just swap it back, all via our web interface.
I want to see a large %, say 80% or more, hit quorum regardless of whether the proposal passes or not. When I started this thread, my objective was to discuss ideas to increase voter turnout and participation in governance. I believe the more often we achieve quorum the results will be either passing more proposals or gaining valuable intelligence regarding why a proposal didn’t pass that could be shared within our community or with other communities to improve or abandon the proposal. Failure to pass due to not hitting quorum provides us little information.
The idea of a ballot is being explored but mostly for convenience. I think that the current cadence of voting is healthy speed is always a factor. I would hate to have a project come to Bancor, try to get whitelisted, just to wait a month to find they’ve been rejected or their proposal failed quorum. That may hurt Bancor’s reputation.
Interesting idea. I wonder how difficult it would be to get BNT added to their platform. I feel confident that voting rewards would need to be paid in BNT.
This is the perfect summary of my thoughts. If a proposal makes quorum but fails, this is a rejection of those ideas and it can lead to more discussion. In the case of a whitelisting, a quorum of Against means “We think this token is not good for Bancor (right now, ever, without changes)”. If a whitelist fails but doesn’t make quorum, does this mean that there is a lack of interest? Could more interest be drummed up? Is it an outright rejection on security grounds? Do you just try again harder (as in the case of DIP)? Consistent quorums are more useful to everyone.
Now that I’ve thought about it more, I agree; we could still do a month-duration reward stream, that way you have a sort of ‘cascade’ of rewards. Effectively, it’d be similar to the weekly multiplier on LM rewards; as long as you vote every week, you maintain maximum flow. This incentivizes consistent participation.
Yup, just echoing @bias previous statement. We need governance to move quickly (more so in crypto where the pace is already accelerated) and we would put ourselves in a significant disadvantage if we switch to a monthly cadence (it would significantly hurt the DAO in getting things done). FYI, I still expect for emergency proposals to be voted on outside of our regular cadence if there is an urgent need (e.g. emergency delisting of a token that might have an infinite printing bug).
What are the advantages of using Sablier as opposed to us distributing the rewards? With the idea being that we are not looking to do an airdrop but rather deposit the voting rewards in a wallet where the user will collect them (and potentially providing the ability to stake those voting rewards directly into our platform)? This would be similar to how you claim your BNT liquidity mining rewards at the moment.
One other thing that we should be cognizant about is that whatever solution we proposed will need to have development time dedicated and the more complex the solution is the longer it will take for it to be implemented.
It’s not an airdrop, it’s a way to ensure that rewards are distributed directly to the holder in a controlled manner, while potentially making revenue for the protocol and simultaneously offloading the development/maintenance work of that functionality on to the Sablier team.
The website doesn’t have too much in the way of explanation. If it’s built on ETH but isn’t an airdrop then users must pay gas to claim? Can you expand on how it could make revenue for the protocol? I like that we could potentially offload effort.
This is exactly correct. A balance accumulates at a constant rate, and at any time the user may withdraw up to the balance. I don’t think we should plan around gas costs, since ETH2 should drive them down to negligible, but if we wanted to mitigate them in the short term, there’s always the aforementioned gas tokens; they could potentially prove useful even after ETH2 goes live.
Compounding streams use the Compound protocol to leverage a technical aspect of how the system actually works to accrue interest on the stream. The stream is deposited as a lump sum, and the portion that the user is permitted to withdraw is increased as a function of time elapsed out of the stream duration set during initialization. The deposit is put into Compound, and is drawn from as the user withdraws their balance.
Not exclusive to compounding streams: At the end of the stream, whatever balance remains is transferred to the recipient; if the sender cancels (which they may do unconditionally), the ‘streamed’ portion of the deposit is sent to the recipient and the ‘unstreamed’ portion is returned to the sender.
The interest accrued can be split between multiple parties, if I’m not mistaken, but it can at least be directed to an arbitrary address.
The obvious consequences of this are that it’s best not to withdraw from your stream and let it run its course untouched if you are getting a portion (if not all) the interest. Which, in the context of voting incentives, leaves us with exactly one choice; the staker must be given a portion of the interest in order to reward them for their patience, but to support the protocol a portion must go to the DAO.
It’s a mutually beneficial relationship: the patient, considerate, consistent voters will get the greatest rewards by default; Compound gets a supply of capital in the form of BNT (assuming they whitelist it); and we get revenue, and higher quality governance.
Yes, I see. My comment about the airdrop was in relation to previous ideas in this thread about voting rewards being airdrop (nothing to do with how sabier distributes funds) but I think we have shifted that to rewards being claimed by the user instead. This will give us some advantages:
Discourages splitting vBNT across multiple wallets (since you are paying fees to stake and to claim)
Some potential integration with letting you restake your rewards directly into Bancor (we get to lock that liquidity directly into the platform)
Potentially integrating with your “rewards” wallet so that if you do withdraw then you could lose your multiplier on BNT rewards
I think this is a great platform for the specific use case of paying project contributors in a controlled manner. I am not sure it’s best suited to what we are looking to accomplish (voter incentives) but would love to hear other members opinion to see if this make sense? As you touch, there could be some potential snags with Sabier in that it lends out the funds to compound (for which BNT is not acceptable form of collateral yet) until they are ready to be claimed. Even if we could opt out of that, I am not sure the advantages trump keeping voter incentives rewards in Bancor. (for reasons above) Note that the Bancor team is working on boarding BNT as a form of collateral on Maker and Aave (my guess is that compound would come after).
Didn’t catch it until just now; if I’m not mistaken, that would be bad. IF vBNT < BNT
I can stake, get my vBNT, sell it for more BNT, and get a bigger stake, but only a limited number of times before I run out of value juice. That is, I’m subject to diminishing returns. IF vBNT == BNT
I can stake, get my vBNT, sell it for BNT, and get a bigger stake; my stake grows at a consistent rate so long as I am able to pay for gas to keep milking the system. My returns don’t diminish, but they don’t grow and are expensive to get. IF vBNT > BNT
Bad. I can get vBNT, sell it for BNT and restake as many times as I like, theoretically without end and my stake grows by a larger amount each time. My returns grow and get proportionally less expensive to get.
This is all assuming I’m understanding correctly the system as it stands. Not directly related to the topic but it’s our governance mechanics so maybe it qualifies?
While I know the Bankless podcast does not show us any love, the end of their 📺 AMA with Scoopy Trooples of Alchemix - Bankless Shows touched on the very issue we seek to address. Scoopy proposed the use of some sort of shard that “can’t be used for voting, but it can be used to buy NFTs and other power-ups that you can use for your character in the DAO.” Their goal is to “make DAO’s fun” because people aren’t “going to participate in high numbers if there’s no reason to come back and check in every day.” This is way over my head technically, but I thought the concept of an NFT was worth including in this discussion since it would cause zero inflation.
Now there’s an interesting idea… You get an “avatar” NFT and instead of voting with vBNT directly, you earn it (maybe via reward streams , analogous to a ‘mana regen’) by voting with your avatar (which has a base voting weight, maybe based on your LP stake?) and instead of staking it, you spend it to get “powerups”, which increase your avatar’s voting weight and can grant other perks (a common one might be “vote weight +1%” or “Reward stream +0.1%”, a super rare one might be “gas subsidies”, a unique [non-transferable] one might be for contributing something great to the DAO in some way and would grant significant rewards and/or voting weight bonuses, things like that). Not necessarily RPG-like but we can use the model in governance to make it a neat little game-type-thing.
We could even make the powerups a lootbox kind of thing, where certain grades of powerups are only available at certain thresholds (only one type of box, you can just dump vBNT into until you’re ready to “crack” it, a process known as “steeping”); the more vBNT you steep your box in, the more powerups and the better powerups you’ll get (i.e., if you reach the max threshold and continue, you’ll just get more top-level gear and/or obscene amounts of common gear), steeped vBNT is burned (this is important because when you steep, you’re realizing your voting power into your upgrades, and keeping steeped vBNT around creates inflation). Basically what I have in mind is, when you’re at a threshold, you have a chance to get one of the powerups for that threshold, OR one or more of a lower-grade powerup, the quantity depending on how far “down” you “roll”; if you have enough to get more than one powerup for a threshold and not necessarily enough to reach the next threshold, the rule applies to each possible powerup “roll” individually, but you will always get something.
Though I think if we were to do this we’d have to come up with a different name for vBNT, make it sound like some kind of liquid that you can soak things in so it helps with the visualization. Maybe “Viscor” (“Viscous Bancor”)?
I’m picking up what you’re throwing down. Great stuff! This could be a governance game changer that creates a mutually beneficial relationship between whales and smaller hyperactive community members with good ideas.
Thanks! I wish I had thought of it myself. When I heard it I immediately thought of this discussion thread and that we could do it better because we’re Bancorians. Actually, Banclords!
I like it. Also I think something like Virtuous would work.
Participating in Bancor on a daily basis is overkill. There will certainly be, and maybe are now, happy participants who are cruising through the governance discussions and forums daily, but this is too much to ask from most people. Something in the weekly range sounds more appropriate. As a sidebar to this discussion of participation, I wouldn’t mind a better summary page format for the tokens and their current and future respective whitelisting and LM rewards status. Right now, I have to burrow through tons of topics and discussions to even keep track of what’s happening with all the whitelisted/LM rewards tokens – and there’s only a couple of dozen. Some day, we will have hundreds. There will be no way the vBNT voters are going to keep track of all the proposals, LM extensions, co-investment modifications, BIPS, etc. All we have now is the proposal list page, and you have to click on each one to figure out what each one is doing and ‘do I care’ and ‘do I need to vote’ or is it futile. There is going to have to be a more ‘at-a-glance’ dashboard for voting.
if you give rewards for voting you will soon see bots vote just for the sake of voting to get as much rewards as possible.
i think every address should be limited to a certain amount (50k?) of voting power and every address without history (only holding and staking vBNT, no transactions ) should be excluded from voting.
also account age (3 month or longer) could be used to limited voting