# Proposal: Extend Snapshot voting indefinitely with anti-tampering contingency plan **URL:** \ **Category:** DAO Archive (SUBMITTED)\ **Created:** [September 3, 2021, 4:27pm UTC](https://gov.bancor.network/t/proposal-extend-snapshot-voting-indefinitely-with-anti-tampering-contingency-plan/2848 "2021-09-03T16:27:06Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 3\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![Daniel](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.bancor.network/daniel/32/45_2.png) [@Daniel](https://gov.bancor.network/u/Daniel)\ **Post date:** [September 3, 2021, 4:27pm UTC](https://gov.bancor.network/t/proposal-extend-snapshot-voting-indefinitely-with-anti-tampering-contingency-plan/2848/1 "2021-09-03T16:27:06Z")
### This proposal is expected to appear on Snapshot for voting on 2021-09-12T12:00:00Z. Make sure to stake your vBNT for voting before this date and time to participate in the DAO decision. # TL;DR 1. Gas fees for voting on Ethereum can be volatile and expensive; this issue gave rise to the highly successful integration of [gasless voting via Snapshot](https://gov.bancor.network/t/bip12-gasless-voting-via-snapshot/1017) to Bancor earlier this year. 2. More must be done to ensure BancorDAO’s resilience to a hypothetical instance of vote tampering on Snapshot. a) Extend the use of gasless voting via Snapshot indefinitely, whilst preserving the BancorDAO’s right to suspend its use at any time, and for any reason. b) In an suspected instance of vote tampering on Snapshot, revert to on-chain voting on Ethereum (with gas fees) as the ultimate source of truth when determining the outcome of the governance proposal(s) in question. # Voting Instructions Vote FOR to implement the proposed changes to the organization of Snapshot for BancorDAO governance. Vote AGAINST to keep the voting system unchanged. # The proposal Whereas high gas fees were previously hindering activity in the BancorDAO governance, gasless voting via Snapshot has drastically improved voter turnout in recent months, such that reaching quorum on whitelisting and LM proposals has seldom since been an issue. So crucial is Snapshot to Bancor’s infrastructue that BancorDAO has consistently ranked as [one of the most active DAOs](https://twitter.com/DeepDAO_io/status/1427519631082754049) in recent months. Moreover, in addition to bolstering protection against double-voting, a crucial anti-spam measure was introduced as per [BIP12 ADDENDUM](https://gov.bancor.network/t/bip12-addendum-reorganization-of-dao-operations-on-snapshot/1467) requiring a 7-day lockup of vBNT staked in governance for voting, preventing against the risk of nefarious actors buying and staking vBNT specifically to influence the outcome of one particular proposal. That said, more measures must be implemented to ensure that BancorDAO is able to promptly and justly resolve a suspected instance of vote tampering involving Snapshot in the future. As such, this post consists of the following proposals: _1. To extend the use of gasless voting via Snapshot indefinitely, whilst preserving the BancorDAO’s right to suspend its use by vote at any time, and for any reason._ _2. In a suspected instance of vote tampering on Snapshot, revert to on-chain voting on Ethereum (with gas fees) as the ultimate source of truth when determining the outcome of the governance proposal(s) in question._ **How would we know if tampering has occurred on Snapshot?** One example of this could be an unusually high voter turnout compared to previous votes, clearly not reflecting the true number of vBNT staked. This would obviously indicate that hackers have compromised the Snapshot system, allowing them to create governance proposals to their own benefit at the expense of the protocol’s health. Taking an extreme hypothetical scenario, this could manifest itself in a proposal to whitelist a unknown token with an immediate LM program at 1000000% APY indefinitely. This proposal could then receive 100,000,000 vBNT votes in favor with a quorum of 100% and a 100% majority. Another scenario that would indicate Snapshot having been hacked is failure to register votes in favor of/against a given proposal, generating an outcome that is not reflective of voters’ wishes. Guidelines are proposed below on how community members should escalate a response to such occurrences where they suspect them. **Does the DAO need to have a vote on Ethereum to determine if Snapshot results should be ignored?** Yes. The security of the governance process is paramount. As such, any vote to nullify the result of a vote on Snapshot would require a **66.7% majority and** **25% quorum.** This is a lower quorum threshold than for whitelisting proposals so as to reduce friction should swift action be required. Meanwhile, it is not too low as to encourage proposals to nullify the outcome of a vote on Snapshot without apparent good reason. **Who can initiate a vote to ignore the result(s) of Snapshot votes, and via what mechanism? Would this require front end support?** Anybody with 25,000 vBNT staked in Governance may initiate such a vote. However, in order for the voting community to be fully informed of the facts before voting, any community member wishing to submit such a proposal would be required to firstly create a forum post outlining their proposal on [gov.bancor.network](https://gov.bancor.network/) and await feedback from other community members _before_ pushing the proposal to a vote. This forum post **must include evidence of suspected voter tampering**. Any vote initiated on Ethereum to nullify a vote on Snapshot without presenting evidence of suspected voter fraud and receiving feedback from other community members, will **not** be considered legitimate even if receives a 66.7% majority and 25% quorum, and **will thus be ignored**. **Does a vote on Ethereum to nullify one vote on Snapshot cause Snapshot voting to be suspended altogether?** Yes. Should one vote be nullified on Snapshot due to suspected voter fraud, voting on Snapshot will be suspended altogether. The BancorDAO would then request a written update on security measures from the [Snapshot](https://snapshot.org/#/) team before considering a new vote on Ethereum to re-instate Snapshot voting. ---
**Author:** ![eldude](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/c6cbf5/32.png) [@eldude](https://gov.bancor.network/u/eldude)\ **Post date:** [September 6, 2021, 10:19am UTC](https://gov.bancor.network/t/proposal-extend-snapshot-voting-indefinitely-with-anti-tampering-contingency-plan/2848/2 "2021-09-06T10:19:49Z")
These are the lowest fees from the last 2 weeks. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/uploads/bancordao/original/2X/4/4d173766d09ec7d0bc813c3d3e8636b5033fba2f.png) Yes, stay on snapshot ---
**Author:** ![glenn](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.bancor.network/glenn/32/1720_2.png) [@glenn](https://gov.bancor.network/u/glenn)\ **Post date:** [September 6, 2021, 8:49pm UTC](https://gov.bancor.network/t/proposal-extend-snapshot-voting-indefinitely-with-anti-tampering-contingency-plan/2848/3 "2021-09-06T20:49:29Z")
Hi @Daniel , Thanks for bringing up this proposal. I agree with your proposal and also the feedback shared by @eldude. The gas costs on Ethereum proper make it prohibitively expensive for the DAO to perform its weekly operations if we had to switch back. There would be a large amount of voters that would no longer participate and it would hurt our quorum numbers. I think we can consider voting on chain in the future if we ever expand to an L2 or sidechain where gas costs are a lot cheaper. Ultimately, I think that snapshot does give us some good capabilities: 1. Delegation, which has helped with voters normally wouldn’t vote otherwise (Our DAO is very active and not everyone can keep up with the daily operations) 2. Different voting strategies such as ranked choice voting: > [@Draft Proposal: Use Ranked Choice Voting for Duration and BNT Reward Rates of Liquidity Mining Campaigns](https://gov.bancor.network/t/draft-proposal-use-ranked-choice-voting-for-duration-and-bnt-reward-rates-of-liquidity-mining-campaigns/2515): > > Pending while snapshot team adds support for modifying the minimum percentage required for a choice to be considered the winning choice. This currently defaults to \> 50% but our DAO has adopted supermajority rules and ideally a choice should only win if it has 66.7% or more of support. Summary : This proposal is seeking to introduce using the ranked choice voting strategy for the duration and rewards rate of future liquidity mining (abbreviated as LM going forward) campaigns. Additionally, it i… These points are are all worth considering since it would be dev work on our end to make some of these things happen if we switched over to voting on chain.